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InTroDucTIon
As the Senate prepares to take up a measure, passed by 
the House of Representatives, for a national renewable energy 
portfolio standard (“RPS”),1 and continues serious deliberations 
about a mandatory greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reduction pro-
gram, it is an appropriate time to examine what role a national 
RPS would have within a mandatory GHG reduction program. 
Because Congress seems to prefer a broad cap-and-trade pro-
gram as the best least-cost vehicle with which to implement a 
mandatory carbon reduction program, tension exists between 
a market-oriented cap-and-trade program and a command and 
control RPS mandate. This debate does not take place within a 
vacuum, as almost half the states have adopted an RPS or similar 
renewable energy targets.2 A national RPS calls into question the 
role such state RPS programs would have both within a national 
RPS and within the context of 
a national carbon cap-and-trade 
program.
Three primary bases for ten-
sion exist between an RPS and 
a cap-and-trade program. First, 
renewables, as imposed through 
an RPS, are typically not the 
least-cost compliant solution 
to carbon reductions, particu-
larly in the earlier stages of any 
carbon cap-and-trade program 
where the required reductions are expected to be relatively mod-
est. Second, once a carbon cap-and-trade program is enacted, the 
purpose of an RPS program becomes more uncertain because 
renewable power purchased pursuant to an RPS program will 
no longer provide any additional carbon reductions beyond 
those required by the cap. Third, it is difficult to integrate RPS 
requirements into a carbon cap-and-trade program in a way that 
produces relatively fair results with respect to the entities that 
purchase the renewables and, therefore, bear their costs. 
Taken together, these three tensions between an RPS pro-
gram and a least-cost carbon cap-and-trade policy tend to weaken 
the current standard rationales for enacting RPS programs. In 
order to properly sort out these issues and develop a coordinated 
and sound national carbon policy that includes a renewables 
component, legislators must evaluate and agree on the specific 
purposes for enacting an RPS program in the context of an 
expected carbon cap-and-trade program. They must also struc-
ture both programs to meet the defined objectives of the RPS. 
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reasons For enacTInG an rps
An RPS requires that electric generators or suppliers source 
a defined percentage of their power from renewable energy 
facilities.3 Qualifying renewables vary by program, but typi-
cally include wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, landfill gas, and 
sometimes hydropower.4 Although renewable energy is a term 
intended to describe energy sources that are considered renew-
able because they are powered by energy coming from an inex-
haustible source, or from sources that regenerate fast enough 
that they will not be depleted, RPS can also include sources that 
do not fit that description. However, all qualifying RPS sources 
currently under the various state standards and proposed federal 
standard are also at least low-carbon or carbon-neutral sources 
of power, and it is this defining attribute that, from a policy per-
spective, is probably the most important aspect of renewables. 
That RPS mandates are pri-
marily carbon reduction man-
dates seems relatively clear. 
Although RPS requirements are 
almost never enacted primar-
ily as specific carbon reduc-
tion programs, probably due to 
political concerns, this seems to 
be their primary perceived ben-
efit. In other words, while states 
and Congress apparently count 
RPS programs as an important 
contributor to GHG reductions, they rarely discuss any specific 
carbon-based programmatic aspects of an RPS, such as explain-
ing how the RPS would fit within specifically adopted carbon 
reduction goals.
Instead, proponents often tout renewables as a sound pol-
icy measure because, in addition to being green from a gen-
eral emissions perspective, they also provide other ancillary 
benefits. For example, renewables are said broadly to promote 
energy security. While renewables do promote certain aspects 
of energy security through supply diversity, they do not tend 
to reduce fuel imports since the power sector generally imports 
only a very small amount of fuel from outside North America. 
Studies on whether renewables contribute importantly to energy 
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price stability also conflict. 5 In general, the International Energy 
Agency has concluded that while “environmental objectives will 
be uppermost,” RPS can provide some energy security enhance-
ments.6 
However, these ancillary reasons for promoting an RPS do 
not appear themselves to be sufficiently compelling to support 
national RPS legislation. Instead, the carbon reduction element 
of RPS requirements appears to be the driving force. That con-
clusion seems obvious when one considers whether states would 
ever adopt RPS programs if qualifying emission sources met all 
of the non-carbon benefits that RPS advocates purport renew-
ables provide, but were in fact carbon-based sources of power. 
In such a case, little advocacy for RPS programs would exist 
at all, and few would be adopted. We can see this quite readily 
when we consider coal-to-liquids plants. In fact, such plants 
do rather efficiently reduce dependence on foreign energy 
supplies such as oil for mobile sources, diversify domestic 
energy facilities, and promote new technological developments, 
but they hardly receive support, and are instead typically 
opposed, because the process is very carbon-intensive.  
If the policy support for an RPS primarily tends to be based 
on the carbon reduction component, it makes sense from a policy 
perspective to evaluate the efficacy and role of an RPS require-
ment within a larger national carbon reduction strategy. Based 
on congressional deliberations to date and proposed legislation,7 
it seems clear that Congress’ current preference to address car-
bon nationally is through a broad cap-and-trade program. Hence, 
an evaluation of the efficacy and role of an RPS program should 
include an evaluation of how an RPS fits within a national GHG 
cap-and-trade program. 
rps unDer a cap-anD-TraDe proGram
Because RPS programs seem largely intended to reduce 
carbon emissions, despite the fact that they do not actually tar-
get carbon emissions, but rather fuel choice, their approach is 
a potentially inefficient command-and-control mandate at odds 
with a market-based cap-and-trade program. Market-based cap-
and-trade programs hold, as their fundamental premise, that 
allowing the regulated community to determine its own solutions 
to meet a mandatory emissions cap is far more cost-effective and 
more certain than a one-size fits all series of command-and-con-
trol mandates, which instead set specific performance or tech-
nology standards.8 As a consequence, cap-and-trade programs 
are expected to provide least-cost solutions to emission reduc-
tion goals. 
benefitS of a cap-anD-traDe proGram
Cap-and-trade programs have two fundamental benefits as 
compared with command-and-control emission reduction pro-
grams. First, by allowing trading, the program does not decide 
who has to make reductions. This allows sources to take emis-
sions reduction steps when the costs are favorable to the source 
and to forgo that option and instead purchase emissions allow-
ances or credits when the costs are unfavorable to a source. 
Second, a cap-and-trade program does not decide what those 
reductions must be or how the source achieves the reduction. 
Instead, the regulated community is free to determine what steps 
should be taken to meet the overall cap. Consequently, then, it 
can develop and pursue the least-cost solutions.
The sulfur dioxide emissions trading approach established 
under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments9 produced vast 
compliance cost savings primarily because the U.S. power 
industry figured out how to burn low-sulfur coal in units not 
designed for such coal, and thereby avoided the costs associated 
with the assumed need to widely employ more expensive scrub-
bing control technology.10 In other words, the market figured 
out a method of compliance that was not anticipated when the 
requirements were adopted. This method likely would have been 
unavailable had a command-and control-mandate based on the 
performance of scrubber technology been adopted. 
Notably, the least-cost result expected under a cap-and-trade 
program is not an end in itself, but rather allows policy makers to 
set more ambitious and more certain emissions reduction targets 
than they might otherwise be able to obtain. EPA observed:
[T]he cost-minimizing feature of cap and trade has 
long-term environmental benefits. Driving down the 
cost of reducing a unit of pollution means that policy-
makers and regulating authorities can set targets that 
reduce more pollution at the same cost to society. This 
system makes it economically and politically feasible 
to achieve greater environmental improvement.11
Given Congress’ concern about the overall impact of any 
national carbon reduction strategy on the health of the U.S. 
economy, the costs of any specific carbon reduction program 
become an important political question. 
effectS of an rpS conflict with cap-anD-traDe
A national RPS program, as a command and control man-
date, could conflict with a market-based cap-and-trade program. 
That conflict is primarily relevant if a known cost discrepancy 
actually exists between renewables as a carbon compliance 
option and other available methods of carbon reduction. The con-
flict emerges clearly in the case of an RPS because renewables 
in fact cost more in the aggregate than other carbon reduction 
options that might be employed, at least until the cap tightens 
over time. 
The relative cost-effectiveness of a national RPS as a car-
bon reduction strategy has been evaluated a number of times. 
Most notably, the 2002 Parer Report to the Council of Aus-
tralian Governments on national energy reform concluded that 
Australia’s national RPS program should be abolished and 
replaced with a national cap-and-trade policy for carbon because 
the RPS proved a cost-ineffective method of obtaining carbon 
reductions when compared with a cap-and-trade program.12 Sub-
sequent analyses of the Australian RPS program concluded that: 
(1) the dollar per ton cost of carbon reductions associated with a 
ten percent RPS standard would support four times the amount 
of carbon reductions if imposed instead as a carbon reduction 
requirement under a cap-and-trade program; and (2) an amount 
of carbon reductions equivalent to what a ten percent RPS stan-
dard would obtain could be achieved through a cap-and-trade 
program at a third of the price.13 
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Similar studies have been performed for a U.S. national 
RPS, and the conclusions are the same. One unpublished study 
concludes that the carbon reductions associated with an RPS 
that rises to ten percent cost more than four times as much as 
would be the case if a cap-and-trade program were placed on the 
power generation sector.14 Another study concluded that an RPS 
is “less cost-effective as a mechanism for reducing carbon emis-
sions from electricity generators than a policy designed specifi-
cally to limit carbon emissions.”15 
As these cost studies make clear, a carbon-cap-and-trade 
program is generally insufficient to sustain widespread penetra-
tion of renewables at higher RPS levels simply as a result of 
power price increases resulting from the cap. If that were true, 
then renewables would be the compliance option of choice in 
the economic modeling described above. Instead, it is generally 
energy efficiency and conservation measures, which often have 
a positive payback over time and thus cost nothing, that tend to 
replace renewables as a more cost-effective compliance option. 
However, some renewable projects remain cost-effective, and 
are undertaken even under a cap-and-trade program, where 
the cost of carbon raises power prices. All of these results can 
change when the stringency of the cap is increased, or if the cap-
and-trade program provides specific incentives to renewables 
through a favorable allowance 
allocation. 
In sum, an RPS appears to 
be, at bottom, largely intended 
as a carbon reduction policy and 
should be explicitly treated as 
such, including open discussion 
of how it fits into any national 
carbon policy, such as a cap-
and-trade program; and an RPS 
mandate is a more expensive and less-cost effective method of 
carbon reduction than simply adopting a cap-and-trade program 
with no such command and control mandates. Because Congress 
has expressed great concern over the cost and broad economic 
impact of a mandatory carbon program, and intends to seek least 
cost solutions where available, the higher cost of an RPS ver-
sus alternatives to produce equivalent carbon reductions would 
seem to argue for a careful assessment of the specific goals and 
benefits of an RPS program in light of an expected mandatory 
carbon cap-and-trade requirement. 
In addition, maintaining an RPS as a requirement indepen-
dent of a cap-and-trade program does not provide more or addi-
tional carbon reductions. This is due to the fact that the carbon 
reductions from the RPS program are simply factored into the 
reductions needed to meet the cap, and therefore become a part 
of the compliance portfolio. As carbon reductions from renew-
ables occur, alternative reductions that would otherwise have 
occurred to meet the cap are forgone. In general, most renew-
able energy produces carbon reductions because a power gen-
erator somewhere reduces its level of fossil fuel consumption, 
often natural gas, in an amount equal to the amount of renewable 
power that is added to the grid. The fossil fuel power genera-
tor that reduces its output is now left with allowances to sell or 
use itself under the cap. This results in an increase in carbon 
emissions somewhere that equals the carbon reductions caused, 
and emission allowances “freed up,” by the use of renewable 
power. Thus, overall emissions remain equal to the level permit-
ted under the cap. 
impactS of an rpS unDer a cap-anD-traDe proGram
While RPS requirements do not provide additional reduc-
tions under a cap-and-trade program, they do define renewable 
power as a specific method of obtaining part of the reductions 
that will be achieved under the cap. This is true because a cer-
tain percentage of renewable power must be purchased under the 
RPS without regard for the cap. Additionally, the cost-ineffec-
tiveness of an RPS is confined to, and incurred by, entities that 
must comply with the RPS mandate, and this occurs outside the 
cap. Thus, the cost of compliance within the cap itself is low-
ered, although the overall cost to meet the cap is higher when 
factoring in RPS costs. 
In this light, RPS programs lose much of their stated pol-
icy support because, upon implementation of a cap, they are 
no longer a carbon reduction policy. Instead, an RPS becomes 
a mandate that a certain amount of reductions to be achieved 
under a carbon cap must come 
from renewable power. Thus, 
the question for policy makers 
to debate is whether renewables, 
despite their cost, are sufficiently 
important to an overall national 
carbon reduction strategy so 
that they should be mandated 
as a carbon compliance mecha-
nism? Despite the importance of 
these issues, virtually no serious 
debate about them has taken place in the United States. Instead, 
the benefits of renewables as part of national carbon policy are 
largely assumed, and their drawbacks ignored.
polIcy consIDeraTIons supporTInG an rps
While good public policy requires a careful assessment of 
both the benefits and drawbacks of an RPS within the context 
of an expected national carbon reduction mandate, the Austra-
lian experience tells us this consideration is also important as a 
practical matter. After the issuance of the Parer Report, recom-
mending that that the Australian RPS be abolished and replaced 
with a more cost-effective cap-and-trade program, investment 
in renewables slowed due to the obvious regulatory uncertainty. 
That uncertainty remained unresolved for another two years as 
Australia reviewed the issues and decided to recommit to the 
RPS, albeit with some adjustments. Therefore, in order to pro-
vide long term certainty in renewables markets, the fact that an 
RPS requirement is not a least-cost solution to carbon reduc-
tion and does not provide any additional reductions beyond what 
a cap would require should be recognized and accepted after 
debate, so as not to cause surprises and associated uncertainty 
later.
RPS obligations often  
fall on the company that 
distributes power.
16Fall 2007
Notably, the Australian evaluation of whether to continue 
with an RPS or replace it with a carbon cap-and-trade program 
provides some insight into specific policies that would support 
continuation of the renewables mandate. The primary reasons 
articulated for continuing the RPS in Australia were based on the 
expectations that renewables would become a more cost-effec-
tive carbon reduction option as the cap tightened over time and 
as the costs of renewables decreased through continued build-
out, and, perhaps more importantly, that renewables presented 
an attractive hedge against future technology or other failure for 
other carbon reduction measures.16 Similarly, the United States 
could also conclude that renewables do promote greater future 
compliance certainty and provide an expectation of lower rela-
tive costs over time, and that those are sufficient reasons to sup-
port continued investment in renewables now so as to preserve 
these future benefits. 
These benefits, rarely articulated forcefully in the limited 
U.S. debate over the role of renewables in a carbon cap-and-
trade program, do provide powerful policy arguments to support 
continuation of renewables programs. In essence, the primary 
attraction of renewables is that the technology is well under-
stood, is fairly readily deployed, and can provide relatively large 
reductions, or avoided emissions, on a project basis. Indeed, it 
is these aspects of renewables that may make them attractive to 
industry. Despite the cost issue, industry has not yet objected to 
renewable mandates on any broad or sustained basis as a cost-
ineffective method of carbon reduction, however industry has 
frequently raised other objections. This may simply reflect the 
fact that while the attributes of familiarity and certainty pro-
vide tangible benefits, they are not recognized in economic cost 
models. Further, as one compares a suite of specific and discrete 
renewables projects with a suite of ubiquitous energy efficiency 
projects that must be undertaken by third parties, namely power 
company customers, ease of implementation for renewables 
may prove to be an important factor in tacit acceptance of RPS 
programs. 
Another benefit of an explicit legislative assessment of 
whether to promote higher-cost renewables requirements when 
a national carbon trading program is expected to follow is that 
specific policy reasons to adopt the higher cost alternative can be 
articulated, and the RPS program tailored to promote the iden-
tified objectives. For example, if one of the reasons advanced 
for an RPS is to make the United States a technology leader 
in renewables, then Congress should evaluate whether renew-
ables research and development programs would help promote 
that objective. Similarly, if one of the articulated reasons for 
employing an RPS mandate is to help the renewables industry 
achieve critical economies of scale and so reduce the cost of 
renewables, then the RPS should be sized to specifically pro-
mote that objective, and no more. 
Perhaps most importantly, if an RPS is to be adopted, leg-
islation should provide a comprehensive package that also 
removes obstacles to broad renewables penetration and ensures 
the renewables target can be met. It is no secret that renewables, 
as intermittent sources often concentrated in specific geographic 
regions of the country favorable to the type of generation at 
issue, require important and large-scale changes to the existing 
transmission and distribution grids in order to achieve signifi-
cant levels of penetration. The Electric Power Research Insti-
tute recently published a paper that specifies precisely what sorts 
of large-scale grid and other technology improvements would 
be necessary to accommodate significant penetration of renew-
ables.17 It is well known that grid improvements are difficult to 
make, take years to permit, and often are not favored invest-
ments by power companies. In addition, newer and better power 
storage technologies will be needed to accommodate large-scale 
renewables penetration.18 Hence, legislative packages seeking to 
address the research, permitting and financing issues associated 
with such improvements would seem to be a critical aspect of 
any sensible and realistic RPS objectives.
promoTInG renewables unDer a  
cap anD TraDe proGram
If it is decided as a policy matter that renewables should 
be promoted as part of a national cap and trade program, there 
are a variety of ways to do this. This Article has focused on an 
RPS because Congress is currently considering such a mandate, 
although other options to promote defined renewables goals are 
also available. An RPS program does have the benefit of provid-
ing certainty that a minimum amount of renewable power will 
be produced. However, that approach does limit the extent of 
renewables penetration to the amount of the RPS, at least until the 
time that renewables become competitive as a power source due 
to a rise in power prices as a result of a tightening carbon cap. 
However, a certain inequity exists associated with RPS 
mandates, in that there is often a disconnect between the renew-
able purchases and the actual carbon reduction, or carbon avoid-
ance. The power company purchasing the renewable power to 
meet RPS requirements has paid for the carbon reduction in the 
form of the cost difference between otherwise available fossil 
power and the renewable power. However, that company often 
cannot use the carbon reduction associated with the renewable 
power purchase for compliance under a carbon cap because the 
power plant that reduces its load to accommodate the renew-
able power is often a different company than the renewable 
power purchaser. Instead, it is either the power generator, which 
reduces its load that obtains the carbon benefit even though it did 
not pay for the carbon reduction, or the entire carbon market in 
general, which obtains a benefit because of lowered demand for 
allowances and greater availability of lower cost carbon reduc-
tions, which are not used in lieu of higher cost renewable power 
reductions (i.e., some of the costs of compliance with the cap are 
transferred to the RPS program).19 
The reason for this inequity is twofold. First, RPS obliga-
tions often fall on the company that distributes power, and that 
company may not own any generating facilities. Second, and 
more importantly, RPS mandates can typically be met by pur-
chasing renewable energy credits. Use of such credits allows 
renewable power sources to situate geographically at the least-
cost sites for the power produced, and renewable power purchas-
ers, located far away from renewable resources, to readily and 
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cost-effectively buy renewable power. The consequence of this 
is that companies obligated to comply with RPS requirements 
can suffer a double hit, in the form of mandatory purchases of 
often higher cost renewable power and the general inability to 
take carbon credit for those purchases under a carbon cap. If 
Congress elects to pass an RPS and/or to allow states to maintain 
RPS requirements after implementation of a carbon cap-and-
trade program, careful thought need be given to identifying and 
accommodating, as best as possible, the impacts an RPS could 
have on cap equities.   
Instead of an RPS, renewable incentives could be added 
in the cap-and-trade program itself by allocating allowances to 
renewable plants through a renewables set-aside, by allocating 
allowances to the power sector based on power output and not 
emissions, or by directing a portion of revenues from any allow-
ance auction to renewables. Each of these mechanisms has indi-
vidual benefits and complications. 
The allowance approach has some appeal in that it provides 
some cost limits on what renewable power will be sold, thus 
renewable power is transformed from a power purchase obliga-
tion under an RPS to subsidized power that will be bought if 
the subsidized price is competitive. However, this approach also 
does not guarantee that a specific amount of renewable power 
will be produced or that the renewable policy objectives will be 
met. Other possibilities abound. For example, in some European 
countries, renewables are promoted outside of the carbon cap by 
feed-in tariffs or other mechanisms providing price supports.20 
These price supports begin to decline over time to reflect the 
expectation that renewable costs should decrease as market pen-
etration increases. Whatever solution is decided upon, experi-
ence has shown that renewable investment is very sensitive to 
regulatory uncertainty, and thus, care must be taken to ensure 
that regulatory support for renewables is not attenuated by the 
form of the mechanism selected to support it. 
It is also important to consider the role and impact of exist-
ing state RPS standards, which present their own complexities 
and may have less well-defined roles once a carbon cap is put in 
place. Thorough discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of 
this Article. However, it should be noted that state RPS programs 
may also warrant reevaluation and refocus once a national car-
bon cap is adopted because these programs also will not produce 
any carbon reductions beyond the level of the national cap. 
conclusIon
It seems premature for Congress to pass a national RPS 
in the face of an expected least-cost national carbon cap-and-
trade program without first evaluating the costs and benefits of 
renewables, and assessing what role renewables should play in 
a national carbon strategy. Renewables are expected to play an 
important role in any national carbon strategy, and good policy 
reasons exist to support that conclusion. However, the debate 
over that issue should be open and clear, and should fully recog-
nize the costs and other issues associated with reliance on renew-
ables as a carbon compliance mandate, to ensure that specific 
policy objectives for renewables can be identified and agreed 
upon, legislation adopted to address those goals, and renewables 
markets provided with certainty. 
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